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1. Introduction 
 
The application of the policies prescribed by the Washington Consensus in developing 
countries are the subject of a vast literature.  What is much less widely recognized is that there 
really exists only one pure laboratory experiment implementing the Washington Consensus in 
the western world: Europe. The aim of this paper is to show that Europe has gone very far in 
the internalisation of the Washington Consensus; in fact, it has devised constitutionally a form 
of government that has no choice but to implement it. We argue below that until now this 
experiment  has not been a success story. 
The expression "Washington Consensus", first introduced by Williamson (1990), may look 
fuzzy. We use it to label any set of  policies that follow three basic principles: First, the search 
for macroeconomic stability (balanced budgets, price stability, and for developing countries 
exchange rate stability). Second, structural reforms aimed at increasing competition and 
openness. Third, the neglect of any possible tradeoff between present and future growth. The 
most important problem with the Washington Consensus is that it loses of sight what should 
represent the ultimate objective of economic policy (growth, full employment), in favour of 
intermediate goals like macroeconomic stability. 
 
The creation of a unique economic zone is one of the areas in which the slow and 
sometimes painful construction of an integrated Europe has progressed more. Member states 
have transferred sovereignty to the supranational level in the areas of monetary, trade, and 
competition policies. Fiscal policy, while still in the hands of governments, is subject to the 
provisions of the Stability and Growth pact. The institutional setup designed in the 1990s is 
rather complex. Supranational and national competencies intersect and interact, sometimes in 
odd ways. Competition policy is completely delegated to the European level, and the 
Competition Commissioner has legislative, executive and judicial powers. For 
macroeconomic policies, on the other side, the assignment of tasks and objectives is more 
vague. Monetary policy is in the hands of a technical body, the European Central Bank (ECB), 
which is given by treaty independence of targets and instruments (within the broad objective 
of price stabilization); furthermore, the ECB is not directly accountable to any political 
authority, which makes its degree of independence rather uncommon. Fiscal policy, the only 
instrument left in the hands of governments, is subject to the constraints of the Stability pact. 
The Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs is formally limited to a monitoring 
task, but has very considerable political influence magnified by the publicity given to its 
recommendations, and their effects on the reputation of governments. To further add to the 
complexity of the institutional setup, the treaties do not provide for a coordination mechanism 
or authority (a "prime minister") between the different actors; this gives even more power to 
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the strongest actors (the ECB, the Competition Commissioner). In other words, while on one 
side, competition policy is conducted at the European level, with the unambiguous task of 
promoting free trade and minimising monopolistic distortions, fiscal policies are carried on by 
a number of relatively weak and uncoordinated actors. 
This setup is no accident. It reflects the neo-liberal doctrine that prevailed in the early 
1990s according to which the areas of competition and macroeconomic policies have to be 
seen largely as substitutes, with the former being superior in terms of efficiency. The tasks for 
policy are then well defined: First, reduce the distortionary presence of the government in the 
economy, which can be done by reducing its size, by balancing the budgets, and by fighting 
inflation; and then use the freed resources to increase competition by means of structural 
reforms aimed at the smooth working of markets. No surprise then that macroeconomic policy 
in the European institutional setting is not at the centre of the stage; furthermore, it is in the 
hands of technical bodies like the ECB or even worse constrained within the limits of 
inflexible rules like the Stability pact. This crystallization of a particular doctrine within 
economic institutions is a peculiar feature of today's Europe, and is unprecedented on such a 
scale. 
 
The European "ideological bias" is further aggravated by the objective difficulties of a 
currency area that is far from optimal. The low labour mobility creates a rigidity in the system 
for which the solution would be price and wage flexibility, that in the form required by the 
theory has not been experienced anywhere, as it would be socially unbearable. The only way 
out from this impasse, consistent with the neo-liberal doctrine that permeates the European 
institutions, is a form of indirect “flexibilization”: Cost reduction through fiscal competition 
and the progressive dismantlement of the welfare state (social competition), on one side are 
the only form of policy available to national governments for reacting to idiosyncratic shocks; 
and on the other, respond to the more general objective of reducing the weight of the state in 
the economy, a pillar of the Washington Consensus. 
 
 The obvious question that arises then is: Were these policies successful in attaining the 
objectives of growth, prosperity and low unemployment? Macroeconomic policy was 
characterized by substantial inertia, at least in the past two decades. Was this choice 
rewarding? We claim in this paper that the answer is no, as the comparison with the growth 
performance of the United States indicates. We claim that the root of the inferior performance 
of the European economy is to be found in the adherence to the neo-liberal doctrine as 
outlined above, and to the substantial neglect of the growth objective in policy choices. We 
also try to argue why this result should not be surprising, as the doctrine has both theoretical 
and empirical weaknesses. 
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This brings to the more general issue of the identification of capitalism with the free 
market paradigm. By looking at the past, we quickly realize that ranking different institutional 
settings in the attempt to find the "best" one is a vain exercise; in fact, different models 
proved successful in assuring prosperity at different points in time, depending on the 
conditions of the moment. In fact, the strength of capitalism resides precisely in the capacity 
to adapt and to accommodate different institutional setups and to deal with the complexity of 
the world. 
 
 Further broadening the perspective one must ask first why should efficiency be the sole 
objective of a modern society1; and then, whether excluding ethical considerations from the 
policy maker's objectives is necessarily the best way to assure prosperity. As recent 
experiences in the developing and transition economies have painfully reminded us, the issues 
of wealth creation and distribution are inextricably linked. This calls for a complex and 
delicate role for policy. Policy choice is a problem of arbitrage between conflicting objectives, 
rather than, as implied by the neo-liberal doctrine, the simple search for a first best outcome. 
Tradeoffs, often ignored by mainstream economics, are at the centre of the stage, and have to 
be faced in making policy choices. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section will present a few stylized facts 
comparing the growth performance of the US and of the largest European countries. The 
following section will describe the mainstream explanation for the European “growth deficit”. 
In section 4 we will challenge this explanation, highlighting empirical and theoretical 
weaknesses alike. Then, in sections 6 and 7 we will argue that tradeoffs, and hence a scope for 
policy action, characterize modern economies. We will also show, by means of a simple ad 
hoc model, how the problem of arbitraging between structural reforms and stabilization 
policies may stem from commonsensical assumptions. Sections 8 and 9 will briefly deal with 
monetary and fiscal policy in Europe, and finally section 10 concludes. 
 
 
                                            
1 In his Keynes Lecture Solow (1998) remarks that: "If pure unadulterated labour-market reform is unlikely 
to create a substantial increase in employment, then the main reason for doing it is anticipated gain in productive 
efficiency, however large that may be. But if we respect the wage earner’s desire for job security, and it seems at 
least as respectable as anyone’s desire for fast cars or fat-free desserts, then an improvement in productive 
efficiency gained that way is not a Pareto-improvement". 
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2. The Facts: Us Growth vs. European Stagnation 
 
The different growth and unemployment performances of the United States and the largest 
countries of the Euro area over the past two decades have generated a huge literature. We can 
try to look into these performances by means of Kaldor's (1971) "magic square", as reported 
in figure 1. 
On each of the axes we represent one of the four main objectives of economic policy: 
Growth of real GDP (g, north), external balance (current account surplus over GDP, b, east), 
unemployment (u, south), and inflation (π, west). 
 
 
 
The figure offers a good snapshot of the difference in performance of the two areas. In the 
1980s, the US had an average growth of 3.2% per year, a full point above the average of 
Germany, France and Italy. Furthermore, inflation and unemployment were lower, albeit at 
fairly high levels. In the 1990s the US was able to make a considerable improvement in its 
performance in terms of inflation without giving up growth. Furthermore, unemployment fell 
significantly over the decade. The European countries on the other hand, had to trade their 
much improved record on inflation with a further worsening of their unemployment situation 
that over the decade averaged nearly 10% (whilst growth stagnated at a mere 2%). 
 
To summarize, we can say that the US reached three out of the four objectives, especially 
in the 1990s, while Europe was only able to master inflation and to keep the external balance. 
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Figure 1. The Magic Square for the USA and for the three largest European countries (Germany, 
France, Italy). Average yearly values for each decade. 
Source: OECD and IMF. Authors' calculations. 
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Why is it so? Is the external imbalance of the US, which accumulated for more than two 
decades, the price that had to be paid to reach a high growth – low inflation path? And was 
the European emphasis on external (and internal) balance, together with the fight against 
inflation, detrimental for growth? In other words, is figure 1 showing us a trade-off between 
policy objectives that was (more or less deliberately) resolved in different directions by policy 
makers on the two sides of the Atlantic? Or was the uneven performance, especially in Europe, 
the effect of policy (and institutional) mistakes, that prevented the economy from reaching all 
the objectives? 
 
 
3. The Brussels-Frankfurt-Washington Consensus. 
 
The general consensus on the above questions emphasizes the latter approach: The 
different position of Europe and the US on the magic square is explained not by different 
policy choices in the past three decades, but rather by the different structure of the economy. 
The US has a more flexible, market oriented economy, whereas European countries have to 
carry the burden of an inefficient welfare state that forces their economy on a low growth – 
high inflation path. This consensus, that we label as the "Brussels-Frankfurt-Washington 
(BFW) Consensus" has academic and institutional supporters alike. Thus, for example, 
Prescott (2003) argues that the differences in hours worked in the US and in Europe are 
almost entirely attributable to an excessive tax burden in the latter, and hence that reducing 
government size would yield higher growth. In a similar vein, Lucas (2003), while conceding 
that in the past Keynesian stabilization policies played an important role in reducing income 
fluctuations, claims that there is no further role for stabilization, while a lot can be gained in 
terms of welfare from structural reforms. We limited ourselves to the some of the more recent 
and prestigious examples, but the list could include hundreds of citations.  
 
The BFW Consensus has also permeated policy making, and the institutions in charge of 
economic governance at the global or regional level. The International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, backed and inspired by the richest countries, have proposed a development 
model based on essentially three elements: First, a reduced role of macroeconomic policy; 
second,, an increased role for market mechanisms (privatization, deregulation, and in general 
structural reforms); and third, full integration with the global economy (openness to trade and 
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free financial flows). The model did not prove as successful as its proponents had hoped2, but 
this has not substantially altered the reference framework of development policy.  
 
In Europe adherence to the BFW Consensus has been pushed to the point that its 
prescriptions were embedded into the constitution, represented by the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam treaties (signed in 1992 and 1997 respectively). The European institutional setup, 
de facto, gives up discretionary economic policy. Monetary policy is delegated to an 
independent monetary authority, the European Central Bank, which is not accountable in front 
of any political body. And fiscal policy is strongly constrained by the Stability and Growth 
pact, which barely leaves space for automatic stabilizers to play. Recently, this setup has been 
criticized by a variety of sources, as being too rigid and unfit to promote growth. But in fact, 
most criticisms are 'internal' and only call for minor adjustments3. With a few exceptions 
(Fitoussi, 2002; Arestis and Sawyer, 2003) nobody has challenged the underlying framework 
that limits the role of government to the removal of obstacles preventing the smooth working 
of markets. As proof, it is perhaps enough to consider that the Constitutional treaty, submitted 
to the Inter-Governmental Conference in view of enlargement, as it pertains to economic 
matters simply crystallized the existing setting without any modification. 
 
 
4. The Theoretical Basis of the BFW Consensus  
 
The theoretical basis of the Consensus is a modern version of the neoclassical paradigm 
that has continuously been challenged since Keynes. After the crisis of Keynesian economics, 
in the 1970s, the neoclassical paradigm has become dominant again both in academic research 
and in economic policy making. Despite its endless variations, the scheme is quite similar to 
the old one: Once public intervention has coped with externalities, clearing and complete 
markets, populated by fully rational agents, usually yield the best possible outcome in terms 
of resource allocation and growth. And when that is not the case, it is because frictions and 
market failures prevent this from happening. The role for policy is then simply to remove or 
minimize these frictions on the supply side, i.e. to intervene on the structure of the economy 
to assure that it conforms as much as possible to the reference model. 
 
 
                                            
2 For two recent accounts of the missed promises of globalisation the reader is referred to Stiglitz (2002) and 
Rodrik (2003). The first is aimed at a general public, while the second is more academic. 
3  Recent examples include Wyplosz (2002), Buiter (2003), Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2003). These 
critiques came to the spotlight in October 2002, when the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, 
defined the Stability pact "stupid", as all rigid rules are. 
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In this perspective, any intervention on the demand side is useless, if not harmful. Once the 
conditions on the supply side are fulfilled, the economy attains the most efficient position, 
unless disturbed by distortionary public measures. This has important consequences in terms 
of policy: If tradeoffs do not exist, the policy maker is not confronted by choices, and there is 
no role for activist policies. Rules become the preferred method for conducting policy, as they 
prevent biases in policy makers' action, and constitute an anchor for private expectations. 
The real business cycle literature is quite paradigmatic in this respect4. Fluctuations around 
the trend are simply the result of optimal responses of agents to shocks. As such they are 
optimal themselves, and any attempt to smoothen the cycle leads to welfare losses. Policy has 
a role only when frictions (for example price rigidity in the recent Neo-Keynesian literature: 
See Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles, 2003) cause deviations from these optimal fluctuations. 
And even in this case, policy action is limited to (more or less) simple rules aimed at 
compensating the distortions/externalities. 
 
A noteworthy feature of the paradigm is the claim of universality, which stems from its 
foundations in the "first principles" of rationality and maximization. As such, it proposes the 
same prescriptions in any situation: A developing country facing the risk of a currency crisis, 
or a mature European country affected by chronic low growth; an economy in transition, or an 
African country confronted with hunger and chronic diseases. This "simplicity" and 
universality of the theory probably contributes a great deal to explaining why, despite all its 
shortcomings (highlighted in the next section), the empirical weakness and the policy errors it 
induced, it is still dominant nowadays5. 
 
 
5. Challenging the Consensus 
 
The BFW Consensus is widespread, and dominates both the academic debate and policy 
making. In spite of that, it has substantial weaknesses, both empirical and theoretical. In this 
section we will pinpoint some of these weaknesses, which may open the way for a challenge 
to the Consensus. 
 
 
                                            
4 The two papers that initiated this stream of research are Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser 
(1983). 
5 The simplicity of the theory may not be the only reason for its dominance in policy making, especially in 
Europe. We argued elsewhere, in reference to the European Stability and Growth pact, that countries may be 
willing to accept potentially welfare reducing restrictions to their freedom of action, in order to acquire the 
reputation needed to access the "club" of virtuous countries (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2002). 
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Do Data Support the BFW Consensus? 
 
The most surprising thing, about a Consensus so widespread in the academic and political 
community, is the scant evidence supporting it. The BFW Consensus has been internalized by 
European policy makers, who, as we noted above, embedded it into the institutional setup of 
the Union. The last serious demand management effort in Europe was carried out in France in 
1981, to be quickly reversed in 1982. Since then, and especially since the Maastricht treaty, 
fiscal policy has been extremely passive, while monetary policy was almost exclusively 
focussed first on exchange rate stabilization and then, since the launching of the euro, on price 
stabilization. Nevertheless the growth performance of the area has been hardly impressive. 
The question then arises: where is the prosperity promised by the Consensus? In fact, if 
anything, the evidence goes against it: the only two episodes of relatively high growth in the 
past two decades, namely at the end of the 1980s and at the end of the 1990s, have both been 
preceded by a substantial loosening of monetary conditions. Monetary policy seems to be a 
major factor, though not the only one, behind recent European growth performance. 
 
A follower of the BFW Consensus could say that the problem lies in the insufficient 
adherence to its prescriptions. Policy may have been virtuous, she would argue, but structural 
reforms have not progressed enough. However, in the light of the available evidence, this 
seems little more than a theological argument. Take the most paradigmatic structural reform, 
i.e. the reform of labour markets. Most economists6 would point at the labour market as the 
main suspect in explaining the strikingly different growth performances of the US and Europe 
over the past two decades. A recent study representative of the Consensus is the one by 
Nickell et al. (2003), who argue that the equilibrium level of unemployment is affected by 
variables that either influence the ease with which unemployed individuals can be matched to 
available job vacancies, or directly prevent wage adjustment in spite of existing disequilibria 
in the labour market. These variables include the unemployment benefit system, the real 
interest rate, employment protection, active labour market policies, union structures, the 
extent of coordination in wage bargaining, labour taxes, and many others. The problem 
though, is that the impressive amount of work devoted to finding empirical support for this 
view has not yielded the expected results 7 : Evidence on institutions and labour market 
 
                                            
6 The literature on the subject is vast. The ground has been laid by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, 1994), 
using as a reference framework the job matching model developed in the early 1990s by Pissarides in the first 
edition of its celebrated book (2000), and by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). More recent contributions include 
Siebert (1997), Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), and Saint-Paul (2000). On the institutional side, two 
good examples of how the Consensus has been embedded in policy making are the OECD employment outlooks 
(see in particular chapter two of OECD, 1999), and the recently released Sapir report (Sapir et al., 2003). 
7  A first reason is the difficulty of constructing meaningful indicators of variables like wage rigidity, 
employment protection, and so on (see Addison and Teixeira, 2003). 
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performance is weak, and often contradictory8, so that the most cautious authors studying the 
subject have to conclude that "the broad–brush analysis that says that European 
unemployment is high because European labor markets are 'rigid' is too vague and probably 
misleading" (Nickell, 1997; p. 73); or again that "we feel that we probably deserve a B grade" 
(Nickell et al., 2003; p. 396). The reason for this cautiousness has to be traced to a few related 
facts: First, as shown by Fitoussi (2003), the negative effects of various rigidity measures on 
employment performance are often of second order, and not robust. In fact in unemployment 
regressions, at least for OECD countries, nation specific factors often become non significant 
once we control for common shocks. Second, Fitoussi et al. (2000) show that structural 
reforms have not always yielded, where implemented, the expected results on labour market 
performance. In general, they find that different degrees of labour market rigidity across 
OECD countries may help to explain the reaction of unemployment to shocks, but reforms 
per se may not be seen as determining variables for medium-to-long unemployment reduction. 
 
Finally, an important and often overlooked factor is the endogeneity of institutions. The 
well known results by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) and others, show how incomplete 
information, leading to moral hazard and incompleteness of markets, prevents the first 
theorem of welfare economics from working, as the market allocation is not (constrained) 
Pareto optimal. Greenwald and Stiglitz show that a government facing the same information 
constraints can act to improve efficiency. But their results also have the less emphasized 
consequence that institutions themselves emerge to compensate for market inefficiencies and 
incompleteness. Once imperfect information prevents contracts, for example, in the labour 
market from yielding the efficient outcome, norms guaranteeing labour protection may 
prevent excessive fluctuations of employment. How can we be sure, then, that labour 
protection legislation is an obstacle to full employment? Could it rather be that it emerged 
precisely in response to persistently high levels of unemployment?9 Paradoxically, the only 
robust result emerging from the wide array of works devoted to the subject is that no single 
labour market institutional setting proves to be superior to the others, and that success is 
determined by the interaction of institutions with country specific factors (on this, see the 
excellent work by Freeman, 2000). This is exactly the opposite of what the BFW Consensus 
holds. 
 
 
                                            
8 For an extensive and critical review on empirical evidence on labour market institutions and unemployment, 
the reader is referred to Baker et al. (2002). 
9 Baker et al. (2002) show that in the paper by Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) it is impossible to 
reject the hypothesis that higher unemployment Granger-causes higher unemployment benefits for important 
countries like the United States, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. They conclude that "While clearly not 
universal, this evidence of reverse causation provides serious grounds for viewing test results showing a 
correlation between high unemployment and long benefit duration with caution." Baker et al. (2002, p. 28). 
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In the field of development as well, the BFW Consensus has substantially failed the 
empirical test. The last decades witnessed some incredibly successful stories, and some tragic 
failures. All of them had complex reasons, and all of them proved wrong the notion that one 
institutional model, based on deregulated markets and a small government, is always superior 
to the others: One size does not fit all. And by looking backwards, of one thing we can be 
assured: Capitalism is sufficiently robust to accommodate rather different institutional settings, 
and results vary according to the period, the objectives, the external conditions and so on. 
Attempting to exemplify the best institutional arrangement, we would have recommended the 
French institutional model in the 1960s; we would then have turned to Japan in the 1970s, to 
the German experience in the 1980s, and finally to the US model in the 1990s. The nationality 
of the best institutional setting for the present decade is still unclear. Can we be sure that, in 
the future, historians will not point at the Chinese model as the uniquely superior model for 
the decade of 2000? 
 
 
The Theoretical Flaws of the Consensus 
 
The lack of robust empirical evidence is only one of the problems of the BFW Consensus. 
As we mentioned above, the reference is an economy with clearing and complete markets, 
perfect competition and rational expectations. In such a model full employment is always 
assured, and policy is ineffective. This framework emphasizes the role of institutions in 
economic performances, especially labour market institutions: Any rigidity leads to departures 
from the reference model and hence to bad economic outcomes. 
 
The main theoretical flaw of this framework is that it is based on a simplistic application of 
the welfare theorems, according to which a perfectly competitive market, absent distortions, 
will always reach the most efficient price/quantity allocation. It is simplistic because the step 
from the theoretical result to the policy prescription is trickier and has to be taken cautiously 
(as was done by the founders of general equilibrium theory). In fact, the efficiency of the 
market outcome strongly depends on a number of assumptions that are rarely observed in the 
real world, from perfect competition to complete markets and information. But once we admit, 
because of "market failures", the impossibility of attaining the first best equilibrium, the 
theory is incapable of establishing a unique ranking of alternative institutional arrangements. 
In other words, it has still to be proven that efficiency is monotonically related to price and 
wage flexibility, so that the closer we get to the benchmark, the better; and unless this is 
proven, the statement "more reforms are good" can not be unconditionally true. 
 
If we broaden the perspective, things become even more complex. One of us has argued 
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elsewhere (Fitoussi, 2002) that democracy and political adhesion of the population to the 
economic governance of a society can actually enhance efficiency, guaranteeing the flexibility, 
transparency and consensus for policy actions that would be missing when ruling according to 
the strict application of a doctrine. 
 
To conclude this section, it is useful to highlight some paradoxes that characterize the 
Consensus. The first is that its policy prescriptions are in one sense, more interventionist than 
the traditional Keynesian stabilization policies, because they require a deep modification of 
the economic and social structure through structural reforms. Hence, on one side mainstream 
economists ask the government to reduce its presence in the economy, and on the other they 
pretend that it can reach into relationships and customs that are rooted in society (often as the 
result of long term complex evolutions), to substitute them with the free market paradigm. 
 
The other paradox linked to the Consensus is its different impact on different layers of the 
world economy. According to many commentators (e.g. Blinder and Yellen, 2001), the 
positive performance of the US in the past two decades may largely be attributed to their 
activist policy, and to the good coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. On the other hand, 
the Consensus is mainly a product of the academic community of the US. It looks as if the 
United States produced a good, the Consensus, that has not been marketed at home but rather 
exported, the greatest consumers being abroad. This consumption can be voluntary as in 
Europe, where policy makers have decided to embed the Consensus' prescriptions into the 
treaties; or it can be the result of a bargaining/bullying process, as was often the case for 
developing countries that were forced to adopt structural adjustment programs in order to gain 
access to international aid (Stiglitz, 2002). 
 
The paradox is even more striking if we look at the progress of economic theorising on 
market failures and on policy making. Contrary to what happened in the 1970s, a large portion 
of economists nowadays believe that regulation and government intervention are key factors 
in guaranteeing durable, equitable and robust growth. But with a few exceptions (the most 
noticeable, as we said, being the US), policy makers still refer to the model of the 1970s. 
 
 
6. Old and New Tradeoffs 
 
The model on which the Consensus builds contemplates no tradeoffs. Once the conditions 
for an optimal working of the economy are assured, it will attain the most efficient position by 
itself, and tampering with it by policy will be harmful. In such a framework there is never a 
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problem of choice. But this problem appeared clearly in the late 1960s, when the well known 
debate on the Phillips curve started. With rational expectations, only surprise inflation could 
(temporarily) move the economy away from its natural unemployment rate. On the other hand, 
Keynesians would argue that as soon as we departed from the benchmark model, policy 
makers could trade inflation for unemployment reduction, and hence would be able to 
"choose" a point on the negatively sloped Phillips curve10. 
 
Today's debate, mutatis mutandis, replicates the old one. The trade-off about which 
economists argue in this case is between current and future growth. The vast literature in 
favour of structural reforms argues that those would enhance the growth potential of the 
economy, without hampering its short term performance; in fact market forces would be able 
to immediately absorb the structural changes. The argument has even been pushed as far as 
saying that this capacity of adaptation by the market could result in higher future and present 
growth 11 . In the worst case there could (temporarily) be losers that would have to be 
compensated by transfers. Absent (or negligible) short term costs, the policy prescriptions are 
straightforward: the prescribed reforms should be implemented without hesitation by any 
country wishing to increase its growth potential12. As we said before, this view stems from the 
confidence in the self regulating properties of the market, which in the mainstream has 
substantially the same foundations since the pre-Keynesians. 
 
In such a framework activist macroeconomic policies are useless, if not harmful. They are 
useless because they do not affect the growth potential of the economy; and they may be 
harmful if they distract resources needed for implementing structural reforms. But a stronger 
link between present and future growth may emerge, once we depart from the benchmark 
model. It is easy to imagine situations in which active policies may improve welfare, for 
example by stabilizing income. On the other hand, structural reforms, in a non idealized world, 
would need time to have their positive effects, and short term costs for the society as a whole 
could appear. Job losses due to restructuring, or the slashing of pension benefits would both 
result in reduced purchasing power, with negative short term (in the best case scenario) effects 
 
                                            
10 The rational expectations revolution, and the policy errors that followed the oil shocks of the 1970s settled 
the debate in favour of the New Classical school. Only recently we witness a "return of the Phillips curve" both 
in empirical and theoretical works. 
11 This is the case, for example, of the literature on the non-Keynesian effects of deficit reduction, initiated by 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990); deficit reduction would, if perceived as credible by markets, have a positive effect 
on expectations and hence on private expenditure; these could more than compensate the restrictive effects of 
reduced deficits on current income. 
12 In fact there is a case for gradualism, when vested interests are strong enough to block the implementation 
of the reform. In the labour market, for example, insiders would resist liberalization (Saint-Paul, 2000). In this 
case, a gradual implementation of the reform would allow to initially exclude the insiders from it, and thus to 
weaken their resistance. The case for gradualism, hence, is not made based on general interest and on the costs of 
reforms for society as a whole. 
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on consumption and aggregate demand. Reforms seem then to be conceptually analogous to 
investment, that needs to be financed out of present resources, but whose product will only be 
available in the longer run. When endowed with scarce resources, then, the government would 
be confronted with the choice of using them for stabilization, i.e. for sustaining current growth, 
or in the alternative of implementing reforms thus focussing on future growth. 
 
Things may become even more complicated if we consider the link between current and 
future growth. In fact, long periods of depressed activity may have long lasting effects by 
throwing the economy out of balance. For example, firm bankruptcies can spread to the 
financial sector, resulting in a credit crunch that may cause a shortage of working capital for 
the production sector, and have heavy negative effects on investment and the capital stock. 
Another example is the potential effect of prolonged unemployment on “deskilling” of the 
labour force. The growth potential of the economy would then be reduced. In other words, if 
current and future growth are complementary, exclusive or excessive focus on structural 
reforms may even prove to be harmful for potential growth, as the positive effects could be 
more than compensated by the underinvestment caused by the poor current performance13. 
 
The stylised facts about Europe that we reported at the outset are a good case in point. It is 
clear by now that in our opinion the different performances of the US and Europe do reflect 
different policy choices and consequently a ranking of objectives. In the US growth and 
employment were a priority of economic policy, so that inflation and external balance were 
sacrificed to it. On the contrary, in Europe adherence to the Consensus has implied the choice 
of an institutional setting completely oriented towards long term growth. The Stability pact 
was designed in order to constrain short term discretionary policy, with the idea that sound 
public finances would improve the prospects for future growth. Similarly, by limiting the 
statutory task assigned to the European Central Bank to containing inflation, the treaties 
proved to be written caring more about the long term effects of inflation on potential income 
than about the need for short term output stabilization. In other words, as figure 1 clearly 
shows, the intermediate objectives of low inflation and external balance were predominant 
with respect to the final objectives of growth and unemployment14. 
 
But in fact, it may well be that it is not in spite of, but rather because of this strong policy 
bias towards future growth, that the potential growth rate of the European economy has 
 
                                            
13 We might even observe a direct negative effect linked to incentives. Reforms alter the balance of power 
between workers and firm owners in favour of the latter. Once their life is made easier, entrepreneurs may lose 
the incentive to innovate and to risk. On the aggregate this could result in lower dynamism of the economy, and 
hence in reduced growth potential. 
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remained disappointingly low. The case of the United Kingdom in this respect may be 
instructive. The common wisdom maintains that the reforms of the 1980s have reduced the 
role of the government in the economy and the associated distortions, thus increasing actual 
and potential growth rates with respect to the other European countries. But on one side, we 
already remarked how evidence on the effect of structural reforms is inconclusive; and on the 
other we notice how another distinguishing feature of the UK institutional setting, namely an 
active and pro-growth macroeconomic policy  has gone unnoticed. While monetary policy in 
the Euro area focussed on price stability, the Bank of England had an active stance. Similarly, 
a wise application of the golden rule prevented the excessive reduction of public investment 
that has been observed in European countries trying to fulfil the Maastricht criteria. 
 
We claim that the lack of interest of European authorities in current growth, rather more 
than structural rigidities, is at the root of Continental Europe's poor economic performance, 
and of its even weaker potential for future growth. We will come back to these issues in 
sections  8 and 9, when discussing the action of the ECB and the working of the Stability pact. 
The next section will develop a simple model in which these tradeoffs are considered. 
 
 
7. A Stylized Model 
 
This simple, ad hoc model, has the scope to show how a trade-off between present and 
future growth could appear in an economy. We are not interested, here, in deriving it from 
microfoundations. We only want to show that, once reasonable assumptions on the aggregate 
effects of structural reforms are taken into account, a trade-off, and hence a problem of choice 
for the policy maker appears. In such a case, that we claim to be the general one, constraining 
policy by means of rigid rules may not be the wisest thing to do, even when we take a long 
run perspective. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
14 Notice that it is not just a question of higher weight given to inflation reduction in the policy maker's 
objective function; growth becomes a concern and hence an objective only once inflation is checked. This 
lexicographic ordering has its raison d'être in the fallacious idea that future and current growth are unrelated. 
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The Economy.
Consider a two period economy, whose aggregate behaviour is described by the following 
two equations: 
 
1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1( )
y y g r
y y y y r1
ε γ
α ρ
− = + −
− = − +
         (1) 
 
The first equation describes the current output gap, that depends on 1ε , a zero mean 
symmetric shock to income, and on the two policy variables: The first, , is deficit or surplus 
(if negative) that in this stylized model directly affects income; the second, , denotes 
reforms of period one; these reforms have short run costs 
1g
1r
γ , which also affect income (for 
example through reduced consumption). Reforms also have long run benefits ρ  on potential 
income, whose evolution is described by the second equation. The current output gap 
influences future potential income as well; we can imagine both effects to operate through 
investment, either by improvements of productive capacity (the effect of reforms) or by an 
accelerator mechanism (the effect of current output gap). We assume that α  is small (as the 
effect of current income on permanent income is low). Finally, we normalize 1 0y = . 
 
The Government's Choice
The government is the only decision maker in this ad hoc economy. In fact, the private 
sector only acts as a feedback device, reacting mechanically to policy choices. The policy 
maker maximizes a simple welfare function: 
 
1 1
1 1 2,
1 1
maxln( ) ln( )
. .
r g
y y y
s t g r d
β− +
+ =
        (2) 
 
In words, the government has a deficit bias in the current period, as it values positive 
deviations from current potential output; but it also cares for the long run growth potential of 
the economy. The tools that the government can use to maximize its objective function are 
reforms and countercyclical deficits. The two are substitutes, because we assume that the 
government is constrained by a total deficit cap d.15
 
                                            
 
15 In a multi period economy, this deficit cap could be made to depend on previous income. 
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The Optimal Level of Reforms
Substituting the budget constraint into equation (1), and then substituting back in (2), we 
obtain an unconstrained maximization problem (notice that the policy maker acts after 
observing the realization of the shock ε ): 
 
[ ]
1
1 1 1max ln( ( 1) ) ln( ( ) ( ( 1)) )r d r dε γ β α ε ρ α γ+ − + + + + − + 1r
)
    (3) 
 
Call ( 1A ρ α γ≡ − + , and assume  (which if 0A > α  is small is not too unrealistic); 
broadly speaking, A represents the net long run effect of reforms. We assume it is positive, 
because if the long term effects of reforms were negative, the problem would trivially yield 
. Notice that we argued in the preceding sections that the positive long term effects of 
reforms may not be warranted (i.e. it may be the case that 
1 0r =
0ρ ≤ ), or that they can simply be 
more than compensated by short term effects (i.e. ( 1)ρ α γ< + ). In other words, by assuming 
 we have decided to put ourselves in the most favourable case for reforms. Finally, 
define 
0A >
1B dε≡ + . B can be interpreted as the total budget constraint. In fact, the shock 1ε  
may either release (if positive) or tighten (if negative) the budget constraint. The solution to 
problem (3), if we take into account the nonnegativity constraint, is 
 
( )1
( 1)max 0,
( 1) 1
Ar B
A
β γ α
γ β
⎛ ⎞− += ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
 
 
Thus, we have a positive level of reforms only if the weight given to the future, and the net 
benefit of reforms, are higher than the short term loss and long run effects of current growth 
losses (given by α  ). 
 
The sign of the derivatives with respect to the constraints is intuitive:  
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
1
2
2 2 2
1
22
0
( 1) ( 1) 1
( 1) ( 1)
0
( 1) ( 1) ( 1) 1
r B
r B
ρ
β γ ρ α γ β
ρ α γ β α γ
γ γ ρ α γ β
∂ = >∂ + − + +
− + + +∂ = − <∂ + + − + +
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( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1
1
2
( 1) ( 1)
0 0
( 1) ( 1) 1
0
( 1) 1
r r
B
r B
β ρ α γ α γ
γ ρ α γ β
α
ρ ρ α γ β
− + − +∂ = >∂ + − + +
∂ = >∂ − + +
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Thus, caeteris paribus, the level of reforms chosen will be higher if the government cares 
more about the future ( β  large), if the short run cost is lower ( γ  small), if the budget 
constraint is less binding (B large), and if the long run benefits of reforms are larger ( ρ  large). 
 
The third condition, in particular is interesting. It says that reforms should be implemented 
in good times (when the budget constraint is less binding) rather than in bad times. 
 
But what is, in fact, important is that we can easily set up a simple model, based on 
commonsensical hypotheses, in which the desirability of reforms, and their "depth", depend 
on a series of parameters like costs and benefits, the degree of preference for the future, the 
strength of feedback effects from actual to potential income, and so on. Thus, the mix 
between the implementation of structural reforms and active macroeconomic policies 
becomes a problem of choice. Only in very particular cases, when the links are all broken (i.e. 
when 0α γ= = ) and when the budget constraint for the government is not binding, the trade-
off disappears. 
 
 
8. Monetary Policy and the European Policy Mix 
 
The theory of currency unions (Mundell, 1961) assigns to monetary and fiscal policy well 
defined tasks. The first is supposed to react to common shocks, by means of changes in the 
common interest rate. The latter, on the other hand, is decentralized and has to take care of 
asymmetric shocks. The monetary authorities of a currency union set monetary policy in order 
to maximize some sort of union-wide objective function (that in the literature is often 
obtained by averaging the objective functions of national monetary authorities). In such a 
framework, the optimal monetary policy response to idiosyncratic shocks is to "do nothing" 
(Lane, 2000). For them it is fiscal policy at the national level that has to avoid inefficiently 
large fluctuations in output. On the other hand, when dealing with common disturbances, 
national fiscal policies would be ineffective, and possibly harmful, unless perfectly 
coordinated. It is in this situation that the common monetary policy has to take care of 
stabilisation. Furthermore, once fiscal policy is restricted to country specific shocks, it is hard 
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to argue in favour of pure inflation targeting on the part of monetary authorities. There would 
be no tool and/or institution in charge of demand management in the face of aggregate shocks.  
 
And yet, this is what the Maastricht treaty has put in place. Contrary to what happens for 
other important central banks (for example the US Federal Reserve), the treaty gives the ECB 
the task of conducting "a single monetary policy and exchange rate policy the primary 
objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this 
objective, to support the general economic policies in the Community" (Art. 3a, emphasis 
added).  
In fact, by looking at ECB behaviour in the first few years of its existence, we can 
conclude that the mandate was closely followed, and the emphasis on price stability was 
predominant16. After managing quite skilfully the late consequences of the East Asian crisis, 
the ECB began in November 1999 to raise rates in response to increasing inflation. In fact, the 
Bank reacted to actual, rather than core inflation (the latter was in fact quite stable), which 
seems to indicate that the risks of overheating of the economy were overstated. At any rate, all 
along the year 2000 we could observe a monetary tightening in spite of weakening demand 
and basically stable (core) inflation. Since then, the stance remained substantially restrictive 
until at least early 2003. The consequence is that monetary policy was in fact procyclical, at 
least over the years 2000-2002, strengthening the slowdown. True, the ECB considerably 
lowered its rates in fall 2001, following the September 11 events. At the same time, though, 
the Fed acted more rapidly and aggressively, inducing many commentators to accuse the ECB 
of excessive inertia. This was even more evident as the European slowdown persisted, and it 
became apparent that growth, rather than inflation was (is) the problem of the early years 
2000s. In spite of this, in virtually all of its official documents, the ECB kept referring to the 
price stability objective. Even over the year 2003, when monetary policy became slightly 
more expansionary, low growth was never cited as a determinant of the Bank’s actions.  
 
To conclude, we can say that the ECB seldom pursued the growth objective; and when it 
did so, that was never done explicitly, often at the price of a baroque and opaque 
communication strategy. 
 
If growth is not an objective of the common monetary policy, and fiscal policy at the 
national level is constrained and confined to country specific shocks, there arises the problem 
of a missing actor in charge of income stabilization at the Union level. This has been solved 
by invoking a sort of "coordination from the bottom", as growth would have to be assured by 
structural reforms at the national level: Balance the budget, reduce the role of the state in the 
 
                                            
16 For a detailed account of the first four years of the Euro, see Fitoussi and Creel (2002). 
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economy by cutting public expenditures; increase the flexibility of labour markets by 
shrinking the welfare state, and increase competition in both product and labour markets 
(particularly the latter, as we discussed above). The adherence of the ECB to the BFW 
Consensus explains the emphasis on reforms that recurs in all of its documents (the most 
recent example is the editorial of the November 2003 bulletin). We saw that according to the 
Consensus such a comprehensive policy framework will lead to an increase in workers’ 
incentives, higher growth and lower inflationary pressures (through the increase in the 
intensity of competition). These reforms, by making national economies more flexible, would 
put them in a position to better absorb all shocks including the common ones. This is why 
they are often considered substitutes for active monetary policy. 
 
The conceptual framework behind the Consensus is obviously shared by most central 
bankers in the industrialised countries. In spite of that, almost invariably, this theoretical 
orthodoxy is coupled with a much more pragmatic attitude in actual behaviour. The most 
striking case is the US Federal Reserve, which continuously manoeuvred its interest rates to 
try to influence markets with the objective of keeping the economy on a low inflation-high 
growth path. Why is it so, then, that the ECB seems to be practically the only central bank 
that acts in accordance with monetary (and fiscal) orthodoxy? 
 
This points to a specific characteristic of the ECB, namely its need, as a young institution, 
to establish a reputation. Credibility is an invaluable asset for an institution that deals with 
(financial) markets in which expectations have an essential role to play. A young central bank 
has to convince markets that it is serious about reaching its objectives, and that it has the 
means and the skill to do it. Taking this into consideration, the restrictiveness of monetary 
policy, and the inertia that has characterised the ECB attitude facing the economic slowdown 
may be seen as signs that the Bank is focussing on its main objective, and that it does take the 
time to accumulate information in order to act efficiently. 
 
While believing that these credibility considerations are important, we do not share the 
opinion that they would be sufficient to justify the course of action the ECB chose, 
particularly since early 2001. In fact, if a restrictive policy was the price to pay in order to 
acquire credibility, then that price was largely paid in vain, as toughness has not been 
identified by the markets with credibility17. 
 
 
                                            
17 Artus and Wyplosz (2002) have shown that if we take a standard measure of the influence of a central bank 
on agents expectations, namely the responsiveness of market-determined long term rates to changes in the 
Central bank rates, the ECB has been much less effective than the Fed and the Bundesbank. 
 - 19 - 
 
There are various reasons why the ECB did not fully convince markets: The most widely 
discussed (Artus and Wyplosz, 2002) are, on one side, the excessively ambitious inflation 
objective it chose (even in a period of low growth, inflation was above the 2% threshold for 
all years except 1999); and on the other, the systematic lack of transparency of its decisions, 
as the "two pillars" were in fact one: the first, money growth, was systematically overlooked, 
while the second, the composite indicator of inflationary pressures, was in fact kept as vague 
as possible to hide the ambiguity between the strategy the Bank was supposed to follow and 
the one it actually implemented. Of course it is not beneficial to the reputation of a central 
bank to miss almost systematically its target; similarly, the lack of transparency harmed the 
effectiveness of the communication strategy, and finally damaged the ECB in its quest for 
credibility. 
 
In addition to these obvious reasons, there is a third one, subtler but more important, that 
has to do with our previous discussion. It is impossible for a central bank to acquire 
credibility if, while attaining its objective, it imposes excessive costs on society. Most theories 
advocating the sole objective of price stability rely on the hypothesis of rational expectations, 
which in turn implies an absence of social costs: Private agents correctly anticipate the bank's 
action, and their behaviour is modified accordingly with no effects on employment or growth. 
In these conditions price stability comes for free, and a central bank that does not pursue it 
acquires a negative reputation. But reality is another thing, and the low inflation objective 
often comes at the cost of reduced investment and growth, as may have been the case in 
Europe in recent years. How credible can a central bank be, if in the middle of a general 
slowdown on both sides of the Atlantic, with the Euro zone economy on the brink of a 
recession, it refuses to lower rates because of a largely undemonstrated inflationary threat?  
 
 Thus policy making  involves tradeoffs and hence choices. Only in the special case of a 
simplified world of "first bests",  the tradeoffs disappear. 
 
 
9. The Stability and Growth Pact 
 
The Amsterdam treaty of 1997 has put in place the Stability and Growth pact, that acts as a 
coordination device "from the bottom" for fiscal policy in the euro area. According to its 
provisions, member countries have to present a yearly "Stability and Convergence Program", 
stating  a medium-term objective for the budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus, 
and a description of budgetary and other economic policy measures being taken to achieve the 
objectives. 
 
 - 20 - 
 
 
The plans are examined by the European Council, which may subsequently issue 
'recommendations', in case the country deviates from the objectives stated in the program. The 
Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties also define an 'Excessive deficit procedure', that gives the 
Commission the power to propose sanctions for countries deviating from the 3% limit; the 
Council then has the possibility (by qualified majority) to impose sanctions on the country not 
respecting the limit. The pact and the sanctioning procedure received a severe blow in 
November 2003, when the Council did not follow the Commission recommendation to 
impose fines on France and Germany.  
 
The main theoretical foundation of the Stability pact is an externality argument: A 
government running a budget deficit has to borrow; in a monetary union this is supposed to 
raise the common interest rate, with restrictive effects on aggregate demand in the other 
countries. This negative externality would induce national governments to run excessive 
budget deficits, making the other countries pay part of the bill. 
 
But the argument could actually be reversed. If the fiscal expansion occurring in a country 
were unjustified, it would result in inflationary pressure, and hence in reduced 
competitiveness. . On the other hand, if the deficit responded to a slump in production it 
would sustain demand and hence income and imports. In both cases, demand for the other 
countries' production would increase, and their deficit (thanks to increased fiscal revenues) 
would be reduced.  
 
A second argument in favour of the Stability pact is credibility: Excessive deficits may end 
up in insolvency, forcing the ECB to intervene (against its own statute) to bail out the country 
involved; otherwise, banks owning the debt would see their financial soundness undermined , 
and face the risk of depositors' runs. The moral hazard aspect of excessive deficits could 
hence undermine the Central Bank credibility in its commitment to fight inflation.  
 
This argument may be dismissed on several grounds. The first is the scarce plausibility of a 
debt crisis in the present context18. As for credibility, it is far from obvious that it would be 
enhanced. The pact was designed assuming that governments would accumulate surpluses in 
good times to allow the operation of automatic stabilizers in bad times. This ideal scenario 
though, did not take into account the fact that this symmetry would only be attained after a 
 
                                            
18 Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) notice that the European banking system exposure and the term structure of 
public debt are more solid than those of Mexico and East Asia during the crises of the 1990s, so that the bailout 
risk is not particularly relevant. And at any rate, they argue that such a risk would be better dealt with by 
improving public debt management and bank regulation.
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long transition. In the meantime, governments are being forced to adopt restrictive fiscal 
policies irrespective of the business cycle phase. The consequence is that the euro area 
economy has experienced an explosive combination of depressed growth and (procyclical) 
restrictive fiscal policy. The three largest countries, Germany, France and Italy do not even 
have room for the automatic stabilizers to play. The situation is unbearable, and results in 
creative accounting, in increasing pressure to revise, soften, or simply ignore the pact, and on 
pressure on the ECB for a more expansionary monetary stance. These phenomena seem far 
more threatening, for the credibility of the European institutional system as a whole, than the 
bailout risk. 
 
Another common argument in favour of the pact builds on the above mentioned literature 
that flourished in the 1990s on the Non-Keynesian effects of budget deficit reductions. 
Broadly speaking, the argument goes as follows: If the budget deficit reduction is credible and 
significant, it may trigger the expectation of a permanently lower share of government 
spending in GDP. The consequent upwards revision of permanent income, will cause private 
expenditure increases, and hence be expansionary. This will in turn reinforce the initial debt 
consolidation. Again, the argument is not convincing. First, the empirical support for these 
effects refers to extreme cases, when public finances are in distress. Now, the state of 
European countries' public finances hardly qualifies as unsustainable. Furthermore, the 
perverse effects of the pact on budget transparency, the attempts to find loopholes and 
shortcuts to meet the requirements, will hardly have a positive effect on private expectations. 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
The adherence to the BFW Consensus has permeated the European Union in the past 
decade, and has created an institutional set up that is ineffective: Discretionary policy is 
severely constrained by the treaties through the Stability pact and the statute of the ECB. Price 
stability is the only policy objective that has to be actively pursued at the Union level, while 
automatic stabilizers are supposed to offset country specific shocks. The Stability pact, and 
the objective of a zero structural deficit, rule out any active fiscal policy at the national level. 
No actor is supposed to take care of common real shocks, as the ECB only has to deal with 
inflation. Consistent with the Consensus, the main policy recommendation is to pursue 
structural reforms, which are supposed to be the cure for all European sicknesses, and to 
imply no short run costs. In short, the economic governance of Europe ties the hands of policy 
makers, with strong negative effects on current economic conditions, based on the 
unwarranted assumption that this would increase the potential for future growth. The rationale 
behind this institutional construction and the policy prescription that it yields is that policy 
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faces no trade-off, as its only role is to accommodate and smoothen the working of efficient 
markets. 
 
The facts reported in section 2 contradict this vision. Two decades of policy inertia in our 
continent have not given the expected results. The poor growth performance has built tensions 
that are finally calling into question the institutional set up. The US Fed model is being 
increasingly invoked for the ECB; and the Stability pact is probably going to be substantially 
ignored. We may be approaching an economic governance of Europe that is less ideological, 
and in which rules and credibility coexist with political choices and discretionary policies. If 
this happens, it will most probably result in more balanced and effective policy making. 
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